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Temporal Subordination and the English Perfect 
1. Introduction 
Beverly Spejewski 
University of Pennsylvania 
Researchers have long puzzled at restrictions on adverbial use with the present 
perfect, which don't  seeem to apply to the simple past or past perfect: 
( 1 )  a. Jake has watered the garden { today/recently/*yesterday/*on Sunday } .  
b.  Jake watered the garden { today/recently/yesterday/on Sunday } .  
c .  Jake had watered the garden { that day/recently/the day before/on Sunday } .  
I n  attempting t o  explain the contrast between present perfect and simple past, 
and between present perfect and past perfect, various claims have been made about 
the structural relations introduced by the present perfect, which are special to that 
tense-aspect form. For instance, extended-now theories (Bennett & Partee ( 1 978), 
McCoard ( 1 978), Vlach ( 1 993» propose that the present perfect introduces a times­
pan that contains the event and either runs up to or includes now. Any adverbial 
modifier must be able to modify this extended-now timespan. Current-relevance 
theories (Twaddell ( 1 968), Comrie ( 1 976), Moens & Steedman ( 1 988» claim that 
the event must have some relevance to now in order for the present perfect to be 
used. Klein's ( 1 992) p-definiteness constraint prohibits having both "topic time" 
and "situation time" assigned to independent known timepoints; the present perfect 
implicitly introduces now as a timepoint for topic time, and so no other known 
timepoint can be introduced for the situation time in which the event occurs . 
Most analyses of adverbial use with the present perfect rely on non-composi­
tional interpretations of tense and aspect; many do not relate the claims made for 
this particular construction to other elements of the language. However, I will show 
that the perfect can be cast as a specific case of a very general temporal construction, 
called "temporal subordination", and that in analyzing it this way, elements of the 
above analyses of the perfect will fall out naturally, as will the adverbial constraints 
i l lustrated in (2) .  In addition, a set of pragmatic effects on adverbial modification 
from Katz & Spejewski ( 1 994) can be explained: 
(2) a. My house has blown up { ??todayl??this year} . 
b. ??Bill Clinton has been president. 
c. Wade has walked the dog { todayl??this morning} .  -if he usually walks 
her some other time of day 
d. Has Kay paid her bills { this monthl??this week} ? -if she has monthly 
but not weekly bills 
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Further data, involving the relation of events in subsequent sentences or clauses 
to those in the perfect sentence, is also predicted by the analysis. 
I assume that the similarities between the simple past and the past perfect are due 
to the ambiguity of the past perfect form between a past -of-perfect and a past -of-past 
reading (after McCawley ( 1973), 259-268) .  The distinction can be illustrated by 
(3) ,  where (3a) indicates a time in the non-adjacent past (past-of-past reading) and 
(3b) is a past-of-perfect, indicating a timespan connected to the past reference time. 
There are also situations in which the past perfect can be used felicitously, but the 
present perfect can not or gives a different meaning (4) and (5). The majority of this 
paper will concentrate on the present perfect, since it is not ambiguous in this way; 
however, the past-of-perfect reading can be handled by the perfect analysis laid out 
in this paper. 
(3)  a. Jake had not watered the garden the day before. 
b. Jake had not watered the garden since the day before. 
(4) a. Jake regretted the events of the night before. He had called his boss a jerk 
and deleted some computer files. 
b .  Jake regrets the events of last night. ??He has called his boss a jerk and 
deleted some computer files. 
(5) a. How had you broken your nose? 
b. ??How have you broken your nose? (both from Michaelis, 1 994) 
In the next section, I will briefly lay out a general theory of temporal relations, 
which I refer to as a theory of temporal subordination. In section 3 ,  I will show 
how the perfect can be accommodated by this theory and the adverbial constraints 
accounted for, and in section 4 I will show how discourse data is predicted by the 
theory. 
2. The Temporal Subordination Theory 
The semantic theory of temporal subordination, as laid out in Spejewski & Carlson 
( 1 992) and Spejewski ( 1 994), proposes that there are two general kinds of temporal 
relation that can hold between two eventualities. The relation we call temporal 
subordination indicates that two eventualities occur at approximately the same 
time, and that there is some import to this temporal proximity. The other relat ion.  
temporal coordination, indicates that the events either occur in distinct time periods, 
or that there is no import to their occurring simultaneously. 
2. 1 .  The two kinds of re/alion 
The temporal subordination relation incorporates a notion of contingency discussed 
by Moens & Steedman ( 1 988). Contingency is a perceived dependence between two 
TEMPORAL SUBORDINATION AND THE ENGLISH PERFECT 
eventualities, such as that found between causal and resultant events, between an 
event and a sub-event, or between the two events in a when-sentence. In these kinds 
of cases, either there is an apparently intrinsic dependence between the events, as 
with sub-events, in which case a hearer can usually identify the dependence without 
any overt linguistic cues, or else a speaker chooses to convey a perceived dependence 
by using overt linguistic cues, such as when. Temporal subordination applies to a 
subset of contingency cases: namely those where there is temporal dependence, 
such that one event occurs within the time introduced for another event. Typical 
examples of subordination are events related by event decomposition, when, or 
sentence-final then, or non-discourse-initial states. 
Contingency is an asymmetric relation: it indicates that one event occurs within 
the time set up by another time. This can be represented using an asymmetrical 
temporal structure. I follow many researchers (e.g. Partee ( 1 984) , Hinrichs ( 1 986), 
Kamp & Reyle ( 1 994)) in assuming that when a discourse is processed, each event 
or state will be related to a reference time. The reference time for an event will 
contain the event, and may extend beyond the event. The reference time for a state 
will be contained within the time of the state, and the state may hold beyond its 
reference time. The reference times of a pair of eventualities can be related in either 
a symmetric or asymmetric way, as we will see, according to whether contingency 
is perceived. 
What is the reference time? In this work, it is a discourse object which represents 
a hearer 's interpretation of the time during which the event is likely to have occurred, 
given the context of the discourse, or a time throughout which the state is likely to 
have held, given the discourse. For an event, the reference time must be a t ime that 
can contain the entire event; for a state, the reference time may be a subinterval of 
the time the state holds, and it will be that portion which is relevant to the discourse. 
Because the reference t ime reflects the hearer's interpretation, i t  is dynamic, so the 
specifications of the reference time may change as the discourse proceeds, and the 
boundaries typically will not be fixed or even specified. In  interpreting a discourse, 
one typically does not have knowledge of the exact times that events occurred, or 
even the exact relative timings of events (e .g.  that event2 occurred three minutes 
after event I ). Rather, we tend to have a sense of the relati ve relations among 
eventual ities, where each event could have occurred within some vaguely-specified 
period of time. This period of time we refer to as the reference time. A hearer may 
use world know ledge ( for instance, how long a particular event typical ly takes) , 
discourse knowledge (such as why two events would be mentioned in sequence) ,  or 
l inguistic knowledge (understanding of temporal terms) in sett ing up the reference 
times. 
Once a reference time i s  created, an event marker i s  inserted within it ,  or i t  is 
inserted within a state interval . We can represent this diagrammatically as in (6) , 
so that if a temporal diagram is considered to be a tree (technically a graph), the 
daughter relation indicates that the daughter is contained within the parent. 
263 
264 
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From the representation of the eventuality, we move to representing temporal 
relations among eventualities. Temporal subordination was described as indicating 
a dependence in which the subordinate event is contained within the time set up 
by the independent event. This is easy to illustrate with our tree-style notation by 
showing that the reference time R2 for the subordinate event e2 is contained in the 
reference time R 1 of event e 1 : 
(7) R I  
� 
e l R2 I e2 
Notice that this structure does not require that the events themselves be over­
lapping; it simply says that the second event is constrained to be within the time 
introduced ' for the first event. The reason for this is illustrated by some when 
sentences from Ritchie ( 1979) and Moens & Steedman ( 1 988) :  
(8) When they built the fifth bridge, . . .  
a. . . .  they took several bids. 
b. . . .  they used the best materials. 
c. . . .  they had a gala opening. 
Here there is a clear linguistic marker (when) indicating that two events are to be 
interpreted with temporal contingency, but we can understand the main-clause event 
as occurring before, during, or after the when-clause event. Moens & Steedman 
explain this effect by saying that this construction allows the events to introduce 
preparatory and consequent stages. The reference time in the temporal subordination 
approach could be considered as a vehicle through which this is possible. 
The representation in (7) is equivalent to a Discourse Representation Theory 
(DRT) structure (Kamp & Reyle ( 1 993» , and can be implemented with the same 
model. The set below is a simplified set of predications that could represent the 
subordination structure for sentence (8c). Using the tree-type diagrams simply 
clarifies the relationship structure. 
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(9) R, � flo 
e , :  Town build bridge 
e ,  � R\  
R2  � R\  
e 2 :  Town have gala opening 
e2 � R2 
In order to represent the coordination relation, I will first introduce one more 
assumption: that the discourse itself introduces a reference time, which serves as 
the overall timespan for the events of the discourse to be contained within. This 
global reference time is represented as Ro. Now, the coordination relation, as in 
( 1 0) below, indicates that there is temporal independence between two eventualities, 
and this can be represented as in ( 1 1 ) ,  where each reference time is inserted directly 
within Ro. This set of relations can also be represented in DRT formulas. 
( 1 0) Jimmy filled a bucket with water. Then he dumped it on his sister 's head. 
( 1 1 )  
[R\ < R2] 
e \ :  Jimmy fill bucket 
e2 :  Jimmy dump bucket 
The relations work just the same for states as they do for events, with the only 
difference being that states will surround their reference times, rather than being 
contained within them. Both kinds of relation specify the relationships among 
reference times, not eventualities, and so the general relations can be specified in 
the same way, independent of the type of eventuality. 
2.2. The temporal structure of discourse 
Armed with the two temporal relations, subordination and coordination, we can 
represent entire discourses and also make predictions about the future structure of 
the discourse . To get a feel for what a temporal tree for a discourse could look like, 
we' ll iook at a short discourse: 
( 1 2) Edmond did a beautiful job of landscaping the yard (e , ) .  He put fruit trees in 
the back yard (e2) . In the front yard he made a large flower garden (e3) .  In it 
he planted both cultivated and wild roses (e4),  and then he installed a fountain 
in the middle (e5) '  In the side yard was a wonderful herb garden (86) '  
The first event is an overall event which the rest of the discourse describes in more 
detail, and so all of e2 - 86 will be subordinate to e , .  (Recall that states surround 
their reference times.) However, there is also a further breakdown of e3 ,  with the 
next two events directly subordinate to it. The diagram for this discourse would be: 
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R, 86 
e� 
I �  e2 e3 14 Rs [14 < Rs] I I e4 es 
There is one special formula indicating the actual temporal ordering of two reference 
times: 14 < Rs . This is included because of the word then relating e4 and es . For 
the rest of the event pairings, we have neither linguistic information nor world 
knowledge to indicate what order any of the events were performed, so there are 
no other ordering formulas. However, we do have world-knowledge information 
indicating subordination/coordination distinctions. 
This example illustrates the way in which combinations of coordination and 
subordination, along with optional ordering formulas, can represent the temporal 
structure of an entire discourse. Any number of eventualities can be coordinated 
together or subordinated to an eventuality, and an eventuality may be in different 
relations with different eventualities. For instance, e4 is subordinate to e3 but 
coordinated with es . 
Eventualities (and their reference times) are incorporated into the tree left-to­
right as they appear in the discourse, and not as they occur temporally. This manner 
of incorporation makes it very easy to make predictions about how a new eventuality 
may be related to existing ones. We can borrow the right-frontier idea from rhetorical 
relations (Polanyi ( 1 988), Webber ( 199 1 ) ,  Lascarides & Asher ( 1 99 1 , 1 993)) , which 
claims that when a structure like our temporal trees is built for discourse relations, 
a new node may only be added as the daughter of a node that is on the right frontier. 
The right frontier in our case includes any reference time which is the rightmost 
reference time in the tree at its structural level . This turns out to be equivalent to 
any reference time which has not had a subsequent reference time coordinated with 
i t  or with any of its ancestors (other than the global reference time) .  In diagram 
(1 3) ,  nodes Ro, R I , and � are currently available as insertion sites. This means 
that the next eventuality added to this discourse may be incorporated as a daughter 
of any one of these reference times. The next eventuality could thus elaborate on 86 
or ( I .  or it could begin a new independent temporal line as a daughter of Ro . The 
notion of insertion sites will be important in section 4 for predicting what kinds of 
discourse continuations are possible after an eventuality has been introduced in the 
perfect. 
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2.3. Temporal adverbs 
Since we will be analyzing the perfect with respect to temporal adverbial use, let 
us now look at how adverbials are interpreted in this theory, following Spejewski 
( 1994) .  There are three ways that temporal adverbials are incorporated into this 
analysis, according the kind of adverbial .  A frame adverbial, such as yesterday, next 
month, or within the hour, indicates a timespan that contains one of the available 
reference times in the discourse. A clause such as ( l4a) indicates that the reference 
time for the event [I take my niece to the playground] is contained within yesterday. 
This is represented in ( 14b) : 
( 1 4) (a) Yesterday, I took my niece to the playground. (b) Ryesterday 
I 
Re I e 
The representation of frame adverbials allows for the adverbial reference time 
to be available as a subsequent insertion site. This predicts that the next eventuality 
introduced in the discourse could also occur within that same time period specified 
by the adverbial, and this is perfectly appropriate. 
Durative adverbials, such as for an hour or from midnight til two, specify 
how long an eventuality lasted. I follow Binnick (199 1 )  in treating duratives as 
specifying a feature of the event rather than the reference time. Durative adverbials 
do not seem to introduce a new site for future events to be located, and so they do 
not introduce a new reference time. Instead, they introduce a predication on the 
event, as shown in ( 1 5) :  
( 1 5) Ro 
I 
RI I e I :Lizzy skate e l one-hour( e I )  
In  a few cases, i t  i s  clear that an adverbial is not meant to  locate the eventual i ty 
in a specific temporal location, but rather it may be considered a modifier on the 
event type itself. These are cases of indefinite adverbials, where it doesn 't  matter 
which particular date the event occurred on, but only a particular property of when 
the event occurred, such as the following example, similar to one in Klein ( 1 992) :  
( 1 6) Lucy was criticized by her pastor because she worked on (a) Sunday. 
Here the adverbial is part of the event itself, so the event in the because clause i s  
[Lucy work on a Sunday] . 
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Summarizing the main points of the theory of temporal subordination: 
I )  There are two temporal relations: subordination and coordination. 
2) If a is subordinate to b, then a 's reference time is within b's reference time. 
3) If a is coordinated with b, then a 's  reference time is inserted as a sister of b's 
reference time. 
4) Temporal orderings among reference times may be specified. 
5) A new node may be inserted as the daughter of any reference time on the right 
frontier of the temporal tree for the discourse. 
6) Frame adverbial reference times serve as parents of other reference nodes. 
3. Temporal Subordination and the Perfect 
3. 1 .  Analysis afthe Perfect 
This basic theory of temporal relations applies fairly easily to the case of the perfect 
in English, handling both adverbial use and the semantics of the aspect, as well 
as making predictions about the effect that the perfect has on the introduction of 
subsequent eventualities in the discourse. 
I propose to analyze the perfect as a case of temporal subordination within the 
clause, rather than between different clauses. Let me introduce the idea by discussing 
informally what the effect of the perfect is. Years of research on the present perfect 
has made it clear that there is some dependence relation (current relevance) indicated 
by the present perfect between the time of utterance and the time of the eventuality 
introduced, and also that these times are temporally related (extended-now). This 
gives us temporal proximity and contingency, the two notions we need in order to 
identify temporal subordination . Analyses based on Reichenbach ( 1 947) also give 
us a three-time relation. All these pieces are part of temporal subordination. Looking 
at the past perfect makes it especially clear that the event introduced in the perfect 
is subordinate to an already-established time. With the past perfect, a temporal 
reference has been set up independently beforehand. and the new eventuality is 
located only with respect to that time. 
The representation of the perfect is fairly straightforward in the system, i f  we 
add one formula as the special contribution of the perfect .  Taking the general 
scheme of temporal subordination, the past perfect could be represented as in ( 1 7) ,  
where ( pr e v  is a previously-introduced event, whose reference time serves as the 
location for the event ( I introduced by the past perfect .  The past perfect can be 
represented by either of the following diagrams, depending whether you prefer to 
follow the standard representation or to incorporate temporal iconicity. In this case, 
both items are introduced at once, so there is no necessary order to their inclusion, 
and some people may find i t  easier to think about the temporal relations by referring 
to diagram (b). 
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( 1 7) (a) (b) 
The symbol X means "abuts" (from Kamp & Reyle ( 1 993) .  The ordering 
formula [R1 X eprev] is added to the general structure of subordination as the 
special contribution of the English perfect. This specification will account for some 
of the constraints on adverbial use, and also part of the semantics of the perfect. 
Notice that the formula specifying the abutting does not add any new structure to the 
representation of discourse. The representation for the perfect relies on structure that 
has been established for the overall theory, which is meant to handle many different 
kinds of cases. The kind of information that is added by the perfect is exactly 
the same kind of information that is added by a temporal modifier such as then. 
Then picks out the coordination structure, rather than the subordination structure, 
and adds its own contribution that the new reference time come after the one it 
is coordinated with. The analysis of the perfect here exactly follows the analysis 
of other temporal specifiers under this theory. No new theoretical constructs are 
needed in order to handle this aspect. I believe this is fairly unique among analyses 
of the perfect. It will be easier to understand the importance of the formula as we 
go along, so will we look first at the general analysis. 
With the present perfect, the event is subordinated to now, or the speech event. 
This is similar to Vlach's "speech situation", which includes relevant properties of 
the speech time. The reference time introduced by now, which I have labelled as 
Rna"" is a contextually-determined time that contains now. Rnaw is similar to some 
versions of the "extended-now" as a timespan that includes now and also contains 
the event (Bennett & Partee ( 1 978), McCoard ( 1978» . Vlach ( 1 993))  also allows 
for a time which contains the event and extends all the way up to now without 
containing it. With the constraint we have added that RI abut now for the present 
perfect, RI instantiates this notion. 
( 1 8) (a) Rna", � now RI  
I 
e l  
3.2. Adverbials and Semantics 
(b) 
[R I  X now] [R I  X now] 
With the general structure identified for the perfect, we can look at the way ad­
verbials are constrained by this analysis. Recall that under the theory of temporal 
subordination, frame adverbials surround a reference time. With the perfect, we 
have two reference times introduced, providing two possible locations for adverbial 
attachment. But each reference time has constraints built into it, and any adverbial 
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that modifies that time must accord with the constraints. 
Containing Rna", Any adverbial that contains the reference node Rnow will also 
have to contain now, since Rnow contains now. There are a number of adverbials 
that can contain now, if they are uttered at appropriate times. These include today, 
this morning, now, this year, and so forth. All of these adverbial are acceptable with 
the present perfect, and their use is represented in ( 1 9) :  
( 1 9) (a) Rtoday 
I 
Rnow 
� now R, 
I e, R, :x:  now 
(b) Rtoday 
I 
Rnow � 
R, now 
I e ,  R,  :x: now 
Containing R. If an adverbial is to contain Re instead, then it must match the 
constraints on Re o which are that they contain the event and also abut now. Any 
adverbial time containing the event and not now must abut now. (If it contained 
now, then it would also contain Rnow .)  Any adverbial defined as abutting now (or 
the established past referent, for the past perfect) can surround Re , and is acceptable 
with the present perfect. This class of adverbials includes recently, just, ever, never, 
not yet, before (now), since Thursday, in the last hour and so on, and their use is 
represented in (20): 
(20) (a) 
Rnow � 
now Rrecent 
I 
R, R,  :x: now 
I e ,  
(b) 
Rnow � 
Rrecent now 
I 
R, R ,  :x: now I e ,  
Unacceptable adverbials Now we can turn to an adverb that is not acceptable with 
the present perfect, and see how this analysis rules it out. Taking an adverb like 
yesterday, we know that it is defined as abutting the day the day containing now 
or speech time, but crucially not as abutting or containing now itself. Of the two 
candidate reference times, only R, does not contain now. But R, is constrained 
to . abut now, and not the day containing now. The meaning of yesterday does not 
allow it to abut now, and so it cannot contain R, . The same argument holds for any 
adverbial that picks out a specific time before now, such as at noon, on Thursday, 
before yesterday, or this morning if it is no longer morning. An adverbial like this 
past week will be acceptable or not, according to whether an individual allows the 
phrase to mean the seven days prior to now or only a calendar week. 
Some adverbials that do not work with the perfect may be very similar to ones 
that do, except that they differ in whether they include the discourse-established 
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time marker in their meaning, or whether they abut the marker. An adverbial like 
after Thursday is not acceptable, because it does not explicitly relate to now or eprev , 
while since Thursday is acceptable because it does. Two days ago, while explicitly 
related to now, does not indicate a time that abuts now, and so it can not be used 
with the present perfect, whereas in the past two days can. (Two days before can be 
used with the past perfect syntactic form, but only for the past-of-past reading, and 
not the perfect.) 
Indefinite adverbials If an adverbial does not fit the constraints on the reference 
times, then it cannot be used to modify the reference time. This does not necessarily 
mean that it cannot be used in a present perfect sentence, but if it is, then it cannot 
modify either of the two reference times set up by the perfect. There are some 
cases, as noted in Klein ( 1 992), in which an adverbial such as on Sunday appears in 
a present-perfect sentence but does not specify a definite time location for the event: 
( 2 1 )  "Why is Chris in jail?" "He has worked on Sunday, and working on Sunday 
is strictly forbidden in this country." 
This is one of those cases in which the adverbial does not anchor the event in time, 
but rather gives a specification on the type of timespan in which the event occurred. 
Here the adverbial would not take the usual meaning of the phrase on Sunday as 
being the most recent or upcoming Sunday, and it would not modify either of the 
perfect 's reference times, but rather would be incorporated into the event at a lower 
structural level . 
A similar constraint against definite reference is imposed on when-clauses that 
modify a perfect, for similar reasons. In order for a when-clause to felicitously 
modify an event carrying a perfect reading, the when-clause must indicate only a 
general type of eventuality (indefinite), as in (22) , and not specify a particular actual 
event or time (definite), as in (23) :  
(22) a. I have driven in Toronto when i t  was snowing. (Norma Spejewski, p.c.) 
b .  1 have been at the racetrack when a car overturned. 
(23 )  a.  ??I have driven in Toronto when they had that big blizzard. 
b. ??I have been at the racetrack when Numero Uno died. 
Thi s covers what kinds of adverbs can be used with the perfect in general , based 
on semantic constraints. In the next section we will look at further constraints on 
adverbs, which rely on our pragmatic knowledge, either about event types or about 
particular situations. 
3.3. Adverbials and Pragmatics 
Using the present perfect with an adverbial seems to have the effect of predicating 
a frame adverbial over a presupposed event. This allows our world-knowledge-
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based expectations to come into play, and potentially to conflict with the adverbial 
information. 
Recall that in the theory of temporal subordination, the reference time of an 
event is described as the time during which a speaker or hearer would expect an 
event to have occurred, given either linguistic or pragmatic cues. We typically have 
some know ledge about how long particular kinds of events take, and we can vary our 
interpretations of reference times accordingly. We also often have knowledge about 
when a given type of event is likely to occur, or how often it tends to be repeated. 
For instance, we may know that John typically walks his dog every morning, or that . 
Mary pays her Visa bill once a month. This kind of information also comes into play 
in the use of adverbials with the perfect. Given that we know that John walks his 
dog every day in the morning, we can say (24a) with today or this morning, but not 
with this evening, even if John actually walked her in the evening today, rather than 
in the morning. Similarly, we can say (24b) only with an adverb that is not smaller 
than our expectation time for the event (Katz & Spejewski ( 1 994». The simple 
past lacks the presuppositional element and does not tap into our expectations in the 
same way. 
(24) a. Wade has walked the dog { today/this morningl??this evening} .  
b. Has Kay paid her bills { this monthl??this week} ? 
Since we typically expect a person to die or be born once, but without any expecta­
tions of when that will be, any sentential adverbial modifying a particular birth or 
death or similar singular event in the perfect is odd: 
(25) a. Our first child has been born { ??todayl??this yearl??recently} .  
b. The President has died { ??todayl??this yearl??recently } .  
c .  Someone has killed the President { ??todayl??this yearl??recently } .  
d .  My house has blown up { ??today} . 
This is explained by two features of the analysis: first, a reference time indicates 
an expected time for an event, and second, an adverbial must contain one of the 
available reference times. An adverbial that contains the expected timespan for the 
event is acceptable, but one that does not is pragmatically strange, even if it conta ins 
the actual location of the event. The use of reference times as a hearer 's expectat ion. 
based partly on linguistic information and partly on pragmatic information, has hoth 
linguistic and pragmatic consequences for the interpretation of described events .  
The adverbials like yesterday were linguistically bad with the present perfec t ; t he 
examples here are not as clearly bad as the earlier disallowed adverbials, but there 
is something rather strange about them, if we have the kind of pragmatic knowledge 
mentioned here. 
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3.4. States 
States in the perfect are subject to the same adverbial constraints as events in the 
perfect. The sentences in (26) show that up-to-now and including-now adverbials 
are fine with states, and (27) and (28) show that definite past adverbials do not work 
with states, nor do pragmatically-conflicting adverbials: 
(26) a. Kent has lived in Prague {for two yearS/since 1989} . 
b. The telephone has been ringing all morning. 
c. I have been very happy { this week/today} . 
(27) a. ??The telephone has been ringing yesterdayljrom 2 to 3 o 'clock/an hour 
ago. 
b. ??The president has been mortally ill this week. 
(28) a. I have been with Frank when he lost his temper. [indefinite] 
b .  ??I have been with Frank,when Kennedy died. [definite] 
States in the perfect also seem to behave more like events than they do otherwise. 
Normally, states are considered to surround their reference times. Now if the state 
surrounds its reference time, and the reference time abuts now, then the state must 
also abut now. But in the perfect the state is not required to abut now: 
(29) I have been in the White House (before) .  
Unlike the simple aspect, the perfect aspect introduces a state with a bounded 
beginning, and a possibly-bounded end. Because of this and the adverbial effects, I 
assume that in the perfect the state is contained in its reference time. 
The interpretation of states in the perfect is not clear-cut, in that it involves 
implicatures. If an explicit frame adverbial is used, the state is contained within 
the adverbial time, and if an explicit durative adverbial is used, then the state is 
understood to hold throughout that time. If no adverbial is specified, then it is 
implied that the state is ended or of unknown status unknown at speech time. (30a) 
is fine with no adverbial , since Nixon's presidency is over, but (30b) is odd without 
modification, since Clinton is sti ll president, in which case , the simple present is 
sufficient. Using a comples aspect implies that the simple is not sufficient. Given 
current history, the adverbial in  (30a) can on ly  be read as framing the event, and in 
(b) as the duration of the event. (3 1 a) with no adverbial makes no claim that anyone 
still is a member of the party, but when a durative adverbial is added, it does. If 
we use a state that is difficult to imagine ending, then its use in a perfect without 
adverbial modification is very strange, as with (32) ;  for an intrinsic property of an 
individual , as in (32b), we also can't  have it start after the individual came into 
being, although possibly at that point. 
(30) a. Nixon has been president (since 1 960) . [frame] 
b. Clinton has been president ??(since 1 993) .  [durative] 
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(3 1 )  a. Everybody has been a member of the Communist Party (jor the last 5 
years) [durative]. 
(32) a. John has liked ice cream ??{since he was a baby}) .  
b. Jackie has been Spanish ??{ ? ?since 1990/? ?for 2 years/since the day she 
was bam} 
3.5. Negated Perfects 
The difference in interpretation between a negated present perfect and a negated 
simple past can also be explained by the way reference times are defined. As an 
example, consider (33) :  
(33) a .  I haven' t  seen that movie. 
b. I didn' t  see that movie. 
Katz & Spejewski ( 1 994) propose that (a) implies that I still have the chance 
to see the movie, whereas (b) carries no such implication, and may even imply 
the reverse. This is accounted for by the perfect having two reference times, each 
of which is a pragmatic entity. First, I will assume a fairly simple interpretation 
of negated events: there is no event of the given type within the reference time. 
Now, suppose we have a simple past negation. This means we have some reference 
time which is strictly in the past of now, and the negation is interpreted as holding 
throughout the past reference time « 34a) below). But if we have a negated present 
perfect, we have two reference times. One abuts now, and this is the one introduced 
by the negated event, so the negation will hold throughout that reference time. 
However, there are two times being discussed here, and both are relevant for the 
interpretation. The perfect's reference time, which contains now, has not had 
negation claimed for this entire time. Since this reference time is one of our 
expectation times, it is still possible for the event to occur sometime within Rnow , 
but only at a time which is after now. 
(34) (a) (b) 
[Rt ::x: now] 
4. Discourse Predictions of the Analysis 
The constraints on where to attach new events into a temporal discourse structure 
also hold for the perfect, and this allows us to predict what kinds of sequences we 
can have in a discourse subsequent to a perfect. Recall that the reference nodes 
along the right frontier are referred to as "open nodes", and that a new event can only 
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be attached as the daughter of an open node. (Since now is not a reference node, 
the ordering between now and I4 doesn' t  matter.) Suppose we have a discourse 
in which the most recently incorporated event was in the present perfect. We will 
then have just added two new reference nodes to the structure, and they will both be 
on the right frontier, since they will be descendents of a node on the right frontier. 
Leaving out any previous events, the structure would look like (35), with open nodes 
marked with "[+0]": 
(35) Ro[+oj 
I 
Rnow[+oj 
� now Rp[+oj [Rp X now] 
I 
ep 
From this structure, we can predict what kinds of relations are possible for the 
next event introduced in the discourse. A new event's reference time must be the 
daughter of a currently-open node, and we can see the potential incorporation sites 
as indicated by the dashed lines: 
(36) Ro[+oj 
r - - - - - - - - - - _ Rnow[+oj Rnew �- - - - - - - - - - -
now Rp Rnew Rp X now r - - - - - - - - - - -
ep Rnew 
The interpretations for these different positions indicate how the new event is 
related to the present-perfect event. If the new reference time is a daughter of Ro 
(or of any open reference node between Ro and Rnow ),  then the eventuality has 
been understood as being temporally independent from the eventuality that was 
introduced in the perfect; i .e . it is not subordinate to it, and it is also not subordinate 
to now. If the new reference time is inserted under Rnow , then a special claim is 
being made: that the new event is subordinate to now; since I know of no other 
case of subordination to now, this event (probably) must be in the present perfect as 
well .  Finally, if the new node is attached to Rp , then the new event is subordinate 
to the previous present perfect event, for instance as an event decomposition. An 
event which is in the present perfect must be attached at either Rnow or Rp, because 
it will be subordinate to now, and an event which is not in the present perfect must 
not be attached to Rnow . It is possible for an event that is attached to Rp not to be 
in the present perfect, as we see in (37d), because a reference node contained in Rp 
need not abut now. Each of these readings are predicted by the general temporal 
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subordination theory, and below we can see examples of each reading, with the 
attachment site given after each. 
(37) a. The president has insisted on his innocence all along. The committee 
decided they needed proof instead. [Ro] 
b. Jason has washed the dishes. He has put away the leftovers. [Rnow] 
c. Sandy has prepared a feast for dinner. She has made crepes and souffle. 
[Rp]  
d. Sandy has prepared a feast for dinner. She made crepes and souffle. [Rp] 
We can also see a case that is ruled out by the theory: a case in which the second 
event is subordinate to now but sequenced with the first event: 
(38) ??Josh has picked up the book. (TheniNext) he has carried it to the table. 
Here both the first and the second perfect must introduce a reference time that abuts 
now. If they both abut now, then these reference times must thus be in some kind 
of containment relation with each other. However, the interpretation that the events 
are sequenced can only be represented by having the reference times be sequenced 
with each other, and this gives an incompatible set of constraints. This means 
that no adverbial may modify the second in a sequence of present perfects if it 
indicates any kind of relation other than containment between the reference times. 
A pragmatically-understood sequencing is disallowed for similar reasons. 
5. Summary 
Interpreting the English perfect within the theory of temporal subordination accounts 
for a number of apparent idiosyncrasies of the English perfect as being instead 
predictable elements of a general theory of temporal relations in discourse. This 
analysis casts the perfect as a case of temporal subordination, where subordination 
forces the reference time of one event to be interpreted within the time introduced 
by another event or situation. For the present perfect, the event being introduced 
is subordinate to now, which means that the event is understood to occur within 
a t imespan containing now, and for the past perfect the event occurs within a 
timespan introduced by a previous event in the discourse. The unique contribution 
of the English perfect is that the reference time containing the event must abut now 
or the previously-established time. This constraint appears to be missing in other 
languages, even when the perfect seems to require subordination, as with Spanish. 
The interpretation of temporal frame adverbials as containing a reference time, 
along with the perfect's interpretation, account for many constraints on temporal 
modification of the perfect. A frame adverbial must contain the event and also either 
contain or abut now. Another facet of adverbial constraint is accounted for by the 
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pragmatic nature of reference times as times during which events are expected to 
occur. 
The theory of temporal subordination also predicts what kinds of discourse 
sequences can occur after a perfect, and what kinds of interpretations they can have, 
based on both linguistic and pragmatic factors. 
Elements of other analyses of the perfect fall out directly from the analysis given 
here. For instance, the two different forms of the "extended-now" are manifest as 
the reference time of the event and the reference time for now; the idea of "current 
relevance" is inherent in the dependency structure between the event and now; and 
Klein 's p-definiteness constraint falls out from the containment relation between the 
two reference times, and the Reichenbachian E, S, and R are present as e, now, and 
RI • 
Endnote 
I wish to thank Greg Carlson, Graham Katz, my family, Chris Barker, Silvia Gennari , 
Montserrat Sanz, the Cliff group at Penn, and the SALT VI participants for helpful 
discussions on this material. 
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